Contradictions in brilliant eyes

With the emergence of an international information policy regime1 over the last few decades, information policy tools have received more attention per se, multiplied in form, and penetrated a growing variety of realms of activity. Their use has been striking in the defense arena, where 85-95% of arms control agreements are now devoted to the compelled information collection, processing, and flows that have come to be called confidence-. and security-building measures. Begidng as verification techniques, that is, infomation flows for the purpose of verifying compliance with treaty provisions, they have expanded to include the building of confidence and security in general. (Both types of information flows are to be distinguished from those that occur outside the treaty context, both generalized [surveillance] and specific [intelligence].) Verification techniques are both human and technological. Inspection teams can be along a border or at the portals or perimeters of arms maqufacturing plants. Technological inforrriation collection may be on the ground or be carried out through aerial or satellite flyovers. In addition to visual information , thermal, seismic, radiation, and other data may be collected. All types. of verification may be con'tinuous, periodic, or on demand. Other types of confidence-building measures range into cultural activities and harmonization of management theory and organizational structure as well as regular flows of trade and commercial information. It is the expressed goal of these agreements to devise such procedures in order to make nations transparent Fascination with the idea of transparency is illustrated in the alluring name "Brilliant Eyes", given to a proposed system of thousands of smart surveillance satellites. Yet all of the issues familiar to those who study other