Restricted Access vs. Open Access Methods of Management: Toward More Effective Regulation of Fishing Effort

Thispapergives an overview ofthe economic rationalefor limited entry as a methodoffishery managementanddiscusses general advantages and disadvantages of license limitation and catch rights as the two primary methods of restricting access to marine fisheries. Traditional open-access methods ofregulation (e. g. , gear restrictions, size limits, trip limits, quotas, and closures) can be temporarily effective inprotectingfish populations, but they generallyfail toprovide lasting biological or economic benefits to fishermen because theydo not restrict access to thefishery. The general result ofregulation with unrestricted access to afishery is addi­ tional and more costly and complex regula­ tions as competition increasesfor dwindling fishery resources. Regulation that restricts ac­ cess to afishery in conjunction with selected traditional methods ofregulation would en­ courage efficient resource usage andminimize the need for future regulatory adjustments, provided that enforcement and monitoring costs are nottoo great. In theory, catch rights are superior to license limitation as a means ofrestricting access to a fishery. 53(3),1991 management can be judged. For exam­ ple, biologists are interested in the main­ tenance of adequate recruitment or im­ provement in recruitment, population age structure, and genetic diversity. Economists are interested in the long­ term achievement of these goals in an economically efficient manner. Econom­ ic efficiency is loosely defined here as society's ability to maximize the com­ bined value ofcommercial, recreational, and aesthetic products and services that can be obtained for a given level ofcost, or the achievement of a given level of products and services at minimum cost. Economists advocate limited entry as a method of fishery management because economic efficiency is not likely to be achieved in an open-access fishery. This paper is presented in five sections. The first section describes how unre­ stricted access to a fishery leads to inef­ ficiency and overfishing. Unharvested fish are common property, which even­ tually creates a situation in which there are too many fishermen in the fishery, each applying too much effort. Excess capital and labor could be used elsewhere in a more cost effective manner and the same quantity offish could be produced at lower overall cost. The second section describes how open-access methods of regulation lead to further inefficiencies. Restrictions or prohibitions on the use of certain types of fishing gear, quotas, size limits, trip limits, and seasonal and area closures can achieve short-term biological improve­ ments, but only by forcing fishermen to use more costly or less productive methods of fishing. The third section describes why, in the long term, unre­ stricted access tends to compromise the biological objectives of regulation. The potential long-term benefits of openaccess regulations tend to disappear due to uncontrolled increases in fishing ef­ fort, all regulated to use economically inefficient methods of fishing. See Anderson (1986), Bell (1978), Crutch­ field (1973), Crutchfield and Pontecorvo (1969), Crutchfield and Zellner (1963), Gordon (1954), Keen (1988), and Scott (1979) for further discussion. Methods of limiting entry attempt to minimize the need to implement regula­ tions that impose further economic inef­ ficiencies. The fourth section summar­ izes some advantages and disadvantages oflicense limitation and catch rights as the two primary methods of restricting ac­ cess to a fishery. Catch rights have better potential to improve long-term biological and economic benefits, provided that en­ forcement and monitoring costs are not too great. Section five summarizes the paper and discusses why managers of marine fisheries in the United States seem to prefer open-access regulations. Limited entry is generally considered to apply to commercial fisheries. This paper follows that supposition; however, sec­ tion five speculates about the possibilities of applying limited-entry methods of regulation to recreational as well as com­ mercial fisheries. Open Access and Incentives to Overflsh Marine fisheries represent a modern version of Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of freedom in a commons" in which fisher­ men, each acting in his or her own self interest, are compelled to overfish and deplete the resources upon which they depend. Fish are said to be common prop­ erty because no individual owns the ocean or the fish in it. Hence, fish may be har­ vested on a first-come-first-served basis by anyone with appropriate gear, subject