A Public-Key Traitor Tracing Scheme with Revocation Using Dynamic Shares

We proposed a new public-key traitor tracing scheme with revocation capability using the dynamic share and entity revocation techniques. The enabling block of our scheme is independent of the number of subscribers, but dependent on the collusion and revocation thresholds. Each receiver holds one decryption key only. Our traitor tracing algorithm works in a black-box way and is conceptually simple. The distinct feature of our scheme is that when the traitors are found, we can revoke their private keys (up to some threshold z) without updating any private key of the remaining subscribers. Furthermore, we can restore the decryption privilege of a revoked private key later. We can actually increase the revocation capability beyond z with dynamic assignment of shares into the enabling block. This property makes our scheme highly practical. Previously proposed public-key traitor tracing schemes have to update all existing private keys even when revoking one private key only. Our scheme is as efficient as Boneh and Franklin’s scheme in many aspects. Our traitor tracing scheme is fully k-resilient such that our traitor tracing algorithm can find all traitors if the number of them is k or less. The encryption algorithm of our scheme is semantically secure assuming that the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. We also proposed a variant traitor tracing scheme whose encryption algorithm is semantically secure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack assuming hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.