Improved Higher-Order Differential Attacks on MISTY1

نویسنده

  • Achiya Bar-On
چکیده

MISTY1 is a block cipher designed by Matsui in 1997. It is widely deployed in Japan, and is recognized internationally as an European NESSIE-recommended cipher and an ISO standard. Since its introduction, MISTY1 was subjected to extensive cryptanalytic efforts, yet no attack significantly faster than exhaustive key search is known on its full version. The best currently known attack is a higher-order differential attack presented by Tsunoo et al. in 2012 which breaks a reduced variant of MISTY1 that contains 7 of the 8 rounds and 4 of the 5 FL layers in 2 data and 2 time. In this paper, we present improved higher-order differential attacks on reduced-round MISTY1. Our attack on the variant considered by Tsunoo et al. requires roughly the same amount of data and only 2 time (i.e., is 2 times faster). Furthermore, we present the first attack on a MISTY1 variant with 7 rounds and all 5 FL layers, requiring 2 data and 2 time. To achieve our results, we use a new higher-order differential characteristic for 4-round MISTY1, as well as enhanced key recovery algorithms based on the partial sums technique.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Practical-time attacks against reduced variants of MISTY1

MISTY1 is a block cipher designed by Matsui in 1997. It is widely deployed in Japan where it is an e-government standard, and is recognized internationally as a NESSIE-recommended cipher as well as an ISO standard and an RFC. Moreover, MISTY1 was selected to be the blueprint on top of which KASUMI, the GSM/3G block cipher, was based. Since its introduction, and especially in recent years, MISTY...

متن کامل

An Improved Impossible Differential Attack on MISTY1

MISTY1 is a Feistel block cipher that received a great deal of cryptographic attention. Its recursive structure, as well as the added FL layers, have been successful in thwarting various cryptanalytic techniques. The best known attacks on reduced variants of the cipher are on either a 4-round variant with the FL functions, or a 6-round variant without the FL functions (out of the 8 rounds of th...

متن کامل

Improved Integral Attacks on MISTY1

We present several integral attacks on MISTY1 using the FO Relation, which is derived from Sakurai-Zheng Property used in previous attacks. The FO Relation is a more precise form of the Sakurai-Zheng Property such that the functions in the FO Relation depend on 16-bit inputs instead of 32-bit inputs used in previous attacks, and that the functions do not change for different keys while previous...

متن کامل

Weak Keys of the Full MISTY1 Block Cipher for Related-Key Cryptanalysis

The MISTY1 block cipher has a 64-bit block length, a 128-bit user key and a recommended number of 8 rounds. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, an European NESSIE selected cipher, and an ISO international standard. Despite of considerable cryptanalytic efforts during the past fifteen years, there has been no published cryptanalytic attack on the full MISTY1 cipher algorit...

متن کامل

Improving the Efficiency of Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Camellia and MISTY1

Camellia and MISTY1 are Feistel block ciphers. In this paper, we observe that, when conducting impossible differential cryptanalysis on Camellia and MISTY1, their round structures allow us to partially determine whether a candidate pair is right by guessing only a small fraction of the unknown required subkey bits of a relevant round at a time, instead of all of them. This reduces the computati...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive

دوره 2015  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015