Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
نویسندگان
چکیده
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearce’s (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 81 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013