Voting with Unconditional Privacy by Merging Prêt-à-Voter and PunchScan
نویسنده
چکیده
We present a detailed comparison of the Prêt-àVoter and Punchscan protocols for booth voting. We also describe a simpler variation that keeps the ballot layout of Prêt-àVoter but borrows the cryptography from Punchscan, which is based on any commitment scheme. By using unconditionally hiding commitments we obtain a conceptually very simple voting protocol with unconditional privacy.
منابع مشابه
Merging Prêt-à-Voter and PunchScan
We describe a variation of the Prêt-à-Voter voting protocol that keeps the same ballot layout but borrows and slightly modifies the underlying cryptographic primitives from Punchscan, which is based on bit commitments. By using unconditionally hiding bit commitments, our protocol obtains unconditional privacy. We suggest a way to make cheating on the computational binding bit commitments imposs...
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Prêt à Voter and Punchscan are two electronic voting schemes that both use paper based ballot forms, part of which is detached and destroyed, to provide receipt-free voter verifiability. However, both schemes share the chain voting problem and the part destruction problem. The first is where anyone who can see the ballot form before it is used can coerce a voter who uses it and the latter where...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and Security
دوره 4 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007