Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks

نویسندگان

  • Enrico Mattei
  • Carlo Carraro
  • Timo Hiller
چکیده

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payo¤s from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of di¤erent size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in di¤erent sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of con‡ict literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric. The model provides a game-theoretic foundation for structural balance, a longstanding notion in social psychology, which has been fruitfully applied to the study of alliance formation in international relations.

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تاریخ انتشار 2011