On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. In this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players’ payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that different dependence assumptions lead to different asymptotic results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72. © 2000 Academic Press
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 33 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000