Past Informed Trading and Past Dealer Inventory in US Equity Markets
نویسنده
چکیده
Several studies document that past returns and past trading volume predict shortterm stock returns. This study considers two new variables: the past number of trades signed as purchase and sale. These variables also predict weekly US stock returns and contain information that is distinct from past returns and past trading volume. Combined trading strategies outperform strategies based on past returns and past trading volume alone. A form of market inefficiency, lagged information dissemination, best explains the predictive power of the past number of signed trades. It cannot be explained by overreaction, biased self-attribution or systematic risk. I also find that the return predictability varies across exchanges and after tick size reductions. Several studies including Hasbrouck (1988, 1991a and 1991b) demonstrate that informed trading activity and dealer inventory costs can explain firm-by-firm spread width. Madhavan and Smidt (1991) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) show that informed trading activity and dealer inventory can also explain how individual trades impact the stock price. My study explores whether proxies for past informed trading activity and past dealer inventory constructed from order flow can predict future one-week stock returns. In a comprehensive dataset covering the major exchanges from 1993 to 2002, it considers 4 items: past informed trading proxies, past dealer inventory proxies, past returns and past trading volume. I find that past returns, past informed trading and past trading volume make distinct and economically relevant contributions to future returns. Past dealer inventory proxies make little or no contribution. It is a puzzle why variables constructed from observed order flow can predict future returns. The common theoretical perspective is to assume that they do not predict returns. For example, Kyle (1985) and many studies that follow assume that market makers set prices so that expected returns are zero given observed order flow. However, these same studies also conclude that informed traders place trades over time so that information dissemination is lagged. Intuitively, if the zero expected returns assumption is violated, agents could infer the direction of informed trading by observing order flow. Because information disseminates slowly, these inferences imply future informed trading in the same direction. In turn, these inferences can then predict future price changes. This form of market inefficiency can be large because an informed trader’s private information may include the existence of new product markets, knowledge of acquirers, or entry by rivals. My study shows that Kyle’s assumption is often violated and contributes to the literature of short-term return predictability. I find that inferences can be made about the actions of informed traders during the lagged process of price adjustment. In turn, agents can use these inferences to predict future returns. Moreover, these returns are permanent and cannot be explained by overreaction or biased self-attribution. The empirical results of this study, which are based on a comprehensive TAQ database that spans 1993 to 2002, can be summarized as follows:
منابع مشابه
Inter-dealer Trading in Financial Markets*
Trading between dealers who act as market makers is a common feature of most major financial markets. With the exception of equity markets that deal with relatively small order sizes, in most financial markets the customer order is filled by one dealer who then retrades with other dealers. Inter-dealer trading is an integral part of market design, particularly for institutional markets that dea...
متن کاملAmbiguity about Informed Trading in Dealer Markets - An Experiment
We use an economic experiment to examine the impact of an ambiguous level of asymmetric information on the behavior of security dealers. Specifically, we distinguish three types of uncertainty with respect to informed trading: risk, compound risk, and ambiguity; for both a monopoly and a duopoly market setting. We find that dealer’s bidding behavior is less aggressive under an ambiguous level o...
متن کاملDiscussion of ‘‘The competitive effects of US decimalization: Evidence from the US-listed Canadian stocks’’ by Oppenheimer and Sabherwal
Models of market microstructure tell us that a spread is necessary to compensate market makers for order processing costs, inventory risk, and adverse selection. Since entry into market making is relatively easy on the Nasdaq dealer market, and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialist faces competition from public liquidity suppliers as well as from regional exchanges, competition should a...
متن کاملDealer Intermediation Between Markets
We develop a dynamic model of dealer intermediation between a monopolistic customerdealer (B2C) market and a competitive inter-dealer (B2B) market. Dealers face inventory constraints and adverse selection. We characterize the optimal quote setting and inventory management behavior for both markets in closed form and reveal how price setting in one market segment influences quote behavior in the...
متن کاملCrossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and Performance
This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another. We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive ~“liquidity”! and negative ~“crowding”! externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dea...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003