Strict Cost Sharing Schemes for Steiner Forest

نویسندگان

  • Lisa Fleischer
  • Jochen Könemann
  • Stefano Leonardi
  • Guido Schäfer
چکیده

Gupta et al. [J. ACM, 54 (2007), article 11] and Gupta, Kumar, and Roughgarden [in Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, ACM, New York, 2003, pp. 365– 372] recently developed an elegant framework for the development of randomized approximation algorithms for rent-or-buy network design problems. The essential building block of this framework is an approximation algorithm for the underlying network design problem that admits a strict cost sharing scheme. Such cost sharing schemes have also proven to be useful in the development of approximation algorithms in the context of two-stage stochastic optimization with recourse. The main contribution of this paper is to show that the Steiner forest problem admits cost shares that are 3-strict and 4-group-strict. As a consequence, we derive surprisingly simple approximation algorithms for the multicommodity rent-or-buy and the multicast rent-or-buy problems with approximation ratios 5 and 6, improving over the previous best approximation ratios of 6.828 and 12.8, respectively. We also show that no approximation ratio better than 4.67 can be achieved using the sampleand-augment framework in combination with the currently best known Steiner forest approximation algorithms. In the context of two-stage stochastic optimization, our result leads to a 6-approximation algorithm for the stochastic Steiner tree problem in the black-box model and a 5-approximation algorithm for the stochastic Steiner forest problem in the independent decision model.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

A Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Steiner Forest Game

Abstract. We consider a game-theoretical variant of the Steiner forest problem in which each player j, out of a set of k players, strives to connect his terminal pair (sj , tj) of vertices in an undirected, edge-weighted graph G. In this paper we show that a natural adaptation of the primaldual Steiner forest algorithm of Agrawal, Klein and Ravi [When trees collide: An approximation algorithm f...

متن کامل

A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares

In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant [7] studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems up to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests. ...

متن کامل

Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems

Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer [14] gave a 2-budget-balanced and groupstrategyproof mechanism for Steiner forest cost-sharing problems. We prove that this mechanism also achieves an O(log k)approximation of the social cost, where k is the number of players. As a consequence, the KLS mechanism has the smallest-possible worst-case efficiency loss, up to constant factors, among all O(1)-budget-ba...

متن کامل

Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Network Games

The report encompasses an overview of recent developments concerning cross-monotonic cost sharing methods, a subject that has received a lot of attention from computer scientists, mathematicians and economists recently. In particular, the results of Moulin and Shenker [12], who established the connection between group-strategyproofness and cross-monotonicity, and those of Könemann, Leonardi, an...

متن کامل

From Primal-Dual to Cost Shares and Back: A Stronger LP Relaxation for the Steiner Forest Problem

In this paper we consider a game theoretical variant of the Steiner forest problem. An instance of this game consists of an undirected graph G = (V,E), non-negative costs c(e) for all edges e in E, and k players. Each player i has an associated pair of terminals si and ti. Consider a forest F in G. We say that player i is serviced if si and ti are connected in F . Player i derives a private uti...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • SIAM J. Comput.

دوره 39  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010