CS 364 B : Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture # 17 : Part I : Demand Reduction in Multi - Unit Auctions Revisited ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
The last several lectures focused on simultaneous single-item auctions, with both secondprice and first-price payment rules. The toolbox we developed for bounding the POA in auctions can also be applied to many other auction formats. In this lecture we revisit an old setting (from Lecture #4) and derive some new insights via this toolbox. Recall the setting of multi-unit auctions with downward-sloping valuations.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2014