Some physiological and biochemical consequences of psychological postulates.

(1) Introduction.-This note lists some psychological, physiologic:.).l, and biochemical predictions that h::1.ve been derived from simple psychological postu]ates. These psychological postul:'1.tes have been used to derive a ne\v learning theory, 1-3 which is called the theory of embedding fields. The mathematical variables of the theory have natural psychological labels-such as "presentation of a letter or spatial pattern at time 4," "guess of a letter at time ~," "stimulus trace," "associational strength," ;etc.-due to the fact that the theory is derived on a psychological basis. Given the psychologically derived theory, one then observes that its mathematical val.iables are already in a form th:'1.t suggests a neuroph)!siological, anatomical, and in some cases biochemical labeling for tl"lese variables. For example, the theory contains geometrical objects \vhich are readily identified \\!ith cell bodies, axons, s)!naptic knobs, and s}"napses. It also contains, associated \,'ith the geometrical objects, dynamical variables that readily call to mind membr:'1.ne potentials, spilcing frequencies, tr:1nsmitter substances, v:'1.rious ions, and the like. Once the mathem:1tical variables are labeled ,,'ith these suggestive ph~'siological and anatomic:1l labels, the psycholo(jically derived l:.1.\"s of the theof)' thereupon imply functional relationships bet\,-een tl"lcse empiric:11 v:1riables, as \\'ell as a psychologiC:11 r:1tion:ile for the existence of these relationships in terms of ho\," the brain might learn, remember, and recall ",hat it has learned. N aturall~' tl"le leap from mathen"latical to neur::1.1 \"ariables cannot be justified in a deductive 'va)'. It is governed, as is inevitable, merely b)'" rules of prudence and the dictates of intuition. Fortunatel~-, the simplest neural labeling seems often to }'"ield functional relationships \vhich represent, at least qualitatiy~el}., kno\vn and nontrivial neurn.! dat:.1.. In other cases, the functional relationships seem never to have been measured, and therefore stand as ne\v predictions. The strel"lgth of such predictio~ls is, of course, no greater than the COl"l.ectness of the neurall:'1.beling, and an assessment of this requires a close scrutin~of the theor}"'s development. 1-3