Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 an Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games

Nber Working Paper Series Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study

Measurement error is ubiquitous in experimental work. It leads to imperfect statistical controls, attenuated estimated effects of elicited behaviors, and biased correlations between characteristics. We develop simple statistical techniques for dealing with experimental measurement error. These techniques are applied to data from the Caltech Cohort Study, which conducts repeated incentivized sur...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Finite Perfect Information Extensive Games with Generic Payoffs

In nite perfect information extensive (FPIE) games, backward induction (BI) gives rise to all pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) may give di erent outcomes for di erent orders of elimination. Duggan recently posed several conjectures in an e ort to better understand the relationship between BI and IEWDS in FPIE games. ...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Exploiting Myopic Learning

I develop a framework in which a principal can exploit myopic social learning in a population of agents in order to implement social or selfish outcomes that would not be possible under the traditional fully-rational agent model. Learning in this framework takes a simple form of imitation, or replicator dynamics, a class of learning dynamics that often leads the population to converge to a Nash...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 on Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study

a Center for Experimental Social Sciences, New York University, United States b California Institute of Technology, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Mail code 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125, United States c Mathematica, 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 920, Chicago, IL 60601, United States d New York University, 19 W 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, United States e University of British Colum...