Konrád and Szelényi framed their book as an alter- native to the narrative of totalitarianism, a narrative that identified the core features of communism as political dictatorship and bureaucratic

Konrád and Szelényi cannot be faulted for not anticipating the political failure of economic reforms from the vantage point of 1973–1974. Still, the rejection of the reform moment they capture in the work not only prevented the consolidation of intellectual class rule, but also helps to explain why Soviet-type systems collapsed so quickly. When the political elite rejected the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, they not only failed to address the crisis of intensive growth in the economy, but also lost the political support of a substantial portion of the intellectual class. By the 1980s, intellectuals had very little to lose by abandoning the system, even second-tier party leaders (who today curiously seem to make up a good part of the club of postcommunist prime ministers in the region). Ironically, in the absence of substantial private property, their social capital, connections (both domestic and international), and educational advantages positioned intellectuals to do well economically and politically under a liberal-democratic market system. In “succeeding,” however, they have converted their social power under one system into new forms of power under yet another. Thus, while intellectuals have generally done well both as a group and as individuals since 1989, they seem to have abandoned the project of intellectual class rule altogether. This too is an irony not anticipated by Konrád and Szelényi, but one that I am sure they appreciate.