ar X iv : 1 71 1 . 06 03 0 v 1 [ cs . G T ] 1 6 N ov 2 01 7 Sub - committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms

Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms

Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representa...

ar X iv : 0 71 1 . 47 59 v 1 [ cs . G T ] 2 9 N ov 2 00 7 Copeland Voting Fully

Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [7] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study...

ar X iv : 1 71 0 . 05 14 0 v 1 [ cs . C C ] 1 4 O ct 2 01 7 On complexity of multidistance graph recognition in R 1 Mikhail Tikhomirov

Let A be a set of positive numbers. A graph G is called an Aembeddable graph in R if the vertices of G can be positioned in R so that the distance between endpoints of any edge is an element of A. We consider the computational problem of recognizing A-embeddable graphs in R1 and classify all finite sets A by complexity of this problem in several natural variations.

ar X iv : h ep - l at / 0 11 00 06 v 3 6 N ov 2 00 1 1 Matrix elements of ∆ S = 2 operators with Wilson fermions

ar X iv : 1 21 1 . 24 05 v 1 [ cs . G T ] 1 1 N ov 2 01 2 Rank - 1 Games With Exponentially Many Nash Equilibria

The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is the rank of the matrix A + B. We give a construction of rank-1 games with exponentially many equilibria, which answers an open problem by Kannan and Theobald (2010).