Iterated Weak Dominance in Strictly Competitive Games of Perfect Information
نویسنده
چکیده
We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n−1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies— regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 107 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002