Detection of Antineutrinos for Non-Proliferation

We discuss the feasibility of using the detection of electron antineutrinos produced in fission to monitor the time dependence of the Plutonium content of nuclear power reactors and large (> 1 MWatt) research reactors. If practical such a scheme would allow worldwide, automated monitoring of reactors and, thereby, the detection of proliferation attempts. Although this idea shows some promise, we find that a practical scheme is difficult to envision. We also consider using fission antineutrino spectra to determine and attribute the fuel in an unexploded nuclear device. We find it would not be possible to determine the isotopic content of such a device in this manner. Finally, we examine the possibility of antineutrino detection of an unannounced low-yield (∼ 1kton) nuclear explosion. We argue this can be ruled out completely. Mail stops and email addresses: B285, [email protected]; B227, anna [email protected]; B227, [email protected]; B243, [email protected]; E541, [email protected]