Anthropomorphism. Motive, meaning, and causality in psychoanalytic theory.

terms does not accomplish the leap across this logical gap. The only way the abstraction process works is via such bridge concepts which link causal and empathic by definition, and by means of parallelistic assumptions about the nature of the apparatus and the nature of experience, such as we have described in the earlier portion of this paper. There are several varieties of concepts which speak of subjective experience in objective terms. One group gives a theoretical, or systematic, status to the terms of commonplace experience. "Tension" (see above) is one such example. Others are: libidinal investment, the wish, the system Conscious, narcissism, and the self. Another group of terms such as "depression" and "anxiety" are commonly used both to denote clinical states and subjective experience. These terms create entities by reifying the terms designating the subjective states and their observable concomitants (Sarbin, 1964), (1968). The third type is seen in the concept of "drive," which brings together a quality of subjective experience and a concept of biological functioning. It is clear that the use of any of these bridge terms always requires further specification of the sense in which it is being used. In all of these cases, diverse models of observation, experience, and conceptualization are amalgamated by means of a linguistic device. Using different terminologies, the issue of these two logically independent realms has been discussed by a number of authors, including Brierley (1951), Grossman (1967), G. S. Klein (1966), (1968), Kohut (1959), Mischel (1964), Meissner (1966), Rycroft (1968), and Sutherland (1963). With still a somewhat different focus, but quite germane to the present issues, Schafer (1968) outlined what he considers two types of theory within psychoanalysis, which he calls the "adaptational" and "dynamic" types of conceptualization. He states that Freud attempted both types of conceptualization, but did not always differentiate and coordinate the two approaches: "Roughly speaking, his evolutionary, adaptational formulations of the psychic apparatus are the ones that tend to be quasi-neurophysiological and mechanistic, and it is his dynamic psychological formulations that tend to be anthropomorphic." Schafer does not necessarily hold to their being logically incompatible, and in fact he argues that each has its value, but "distinguishing one from the other helps one to understand what these authors [Hartmann and Rapaport] and Freud are doing in one context or another" (p. 51). We speak with Schafer of coordinating two types of approach in dealing with two logically independent models of explanation. The only way to use them simultaneously is by coordinating them in their application to the empirical unity of the phenomena under study. For example, in psychophysiological research we work with a notion of covariants, such as the physiological concomitants of a reported experience. The coordination is an empirical activity, which is not equivalent to providing a unitary explanation for experience and physiology. We may try to establish a concordance, or parallelism, which will tell something about correlations. Only some superordinate framework, yet to be discovered, could provide one logical system in which both aspects could be encompassed (cf. Langer, 1967). In current dream research, for example, there is a high correlation between dreaming and rapid eye movement sleep (REMS). However, no greater understanding of the meaning of dreams is derived from the clarification of the REM mechanism. Even the question of the precise nature of the correlation between dreaming and REM sleep remains a matter of controversy. In the psychophysiology of affect, too, perfect correlations are not found between an affective state, as defined physiologically, and the same state as defined experientially. The question of how to deal with these various contrasting pairs of terms is one which was taken up in the very earliest of Freud's psychoanalytic writings, and even in his neurological writings (1891). In the "Project" (1895), he attempted to conceptualize the transformation of qualities into quantities. In The Interpretation of Dreams he took up the same issue again in relation to the question of how the wish or the intention (psychological functions) arises from the basic biological organization of the infant. In Studies on Hysteria (1893-1895) one can see throughout the work, particularly in the contrast between Breuer's section and Freud's section, the attempt to conceptualize clinical phenomena in both causal and motivational terms. Freud's discussion of the organization of memories and their role in pathogenesis, for example, represents an early formulation of the relationship between causal factors and motivational factors in pathogenesis. In general, in these early writings, one finds a constant interplay between dynamic, i.e., conflictdefense, formulations of psychological states and physiological, mechanical, and neurological expositions The problem of the distinction between the two types of formulation, one in causal terms and the other in intentional terms, permeates virtually every level of the theory, in every stage of its development. It goes beyond questions of whether or not experience can be reduced to neurophysiological terms. We encounter this difficulty whenever we try to distinguish descriptive from systematic usage of terms, or experiential usage from systematic. For example, in 1912, Freud said (p. 264): It is by no means impossible for the product of unconscious activity to pierce into consciousness, but a certain amount of exertion is needed for this task. When we try to do it in ourselves, we become aware of a distinct feeling of repulsion which must be overcome, and when we produce it in a patient we get the most unquestionable signs of what we call his resistance to it. Thus, there is an experienced feeling of the resistance to making the unconscious conscious. Resistance has an introspectable referent and a theoretical sense as well. This statement quite clearly also implies an introspectable aspect to energy. In fact, the systematic and experiential uses of "energy" and "libido" are not consistently distinguished in Freud's writings. He may speak of "libido" or "cathexis" as equivalent to investment or interest (e.g., 1911, p. 70); (1917, p. 224).