Intentional Action in Folk Psychology

There is consensus in psychology and cognitive science that the capacity to recognize a behavior as intentional is a central component of human social cognition; that this capacity has evolved for its adaptive value in social interaction; and that it develops rather rapidly in the early years of childhood (Malle et al. 2001; Zelazo et al. 1999). We also know that adults judge intentionality fast and with ease and that these judgments both regulate attention in social interaction and guide explanations and evaluations of behavior (Malle 2004). But exactly how do people conceptualize intentional action and how do they judge a given behavior as intentional? People share a powerful folk concept of intentionality that is acquired by interacting with other people in human culture. At least some folk concepts are historically and cross-culturally stabl~. and the evidence suggests that intentionality is one of them (Malle 2008). Furthermore, the concept of intentionality is part of folk psychologythe larger conceptual and cognitive apparatus that allows people to make sense of human behavior in terms of mental states. In fact, intentionality may be the core concept of folk psychology, as it connects behavior directly with the mind, by classifying a behavior as intentional when it is characteristically caused by certain mental processes and states (such as belief, intention, and awareness). Importantly, the folk concept of intentional action is not just a cultural hypothesis that could easily be defeated through philosophical analysis or scientific discoveries. If a scholar tried to convince people that the behaviors they previously judged to be intentional are in reality not intentional. these people would be puzzled rather than impressed; the scholar would appear to make a conceptual mistake, not an empirical claim. Likewise. if another scholar told people that intentions are not based on beliefs and desires but rather on the recursive firing of two particular brain structures, they may just shrug. An intention has to be somehow implemented in the brain (folk psychology is mute on the details here), but this does not mean that the agent did not integrate various beliefs and desires when forming the intention. The domain of human behavior is fundamentally framed by the concept of intentionality, and people may be incapable of thinking about behavior in any other way. Perhaps rightly so; for the adaptive advantage of sophisticated intentionality perceptions is at least partially grounded in their