A Dynamic Model of Dissonance Reduction in a Modular Mind

This article establishes an economic framework to identify the conditions under which an optimizing agent may seek (or not seek) to engage in costly dissonance reduction. We set up a dynamic model of decision-making in which the individual’s mind is composed of a coordinating principal and 2 conflicting agents. We take into account the cognitive dissonance experienced as a result of the conflict between the agents. Each agent (or self) is specialized in perceiving a particular type of signal and performing a task. Dissonance levels in our model are not constant. Instead, the individual’s splitselves are open to habituation, which can lead to a reduction in cognitive dissonance. Therefore, motivated habituation appears as a way to avoid dissonance. We prove the existence of an optimal strategy with a threshold structure. Our results show that the existence of intrapersonal conflict may be a long run phenomenon even in an optimizing mind.