Iterated Regret Minimization in Voting Games

نویسندگان

  • Miranda Emery
  • Mark C. Wilson
چکیده

The game-theoretic solution concept Iterated Regret Minimization (IRM) was introduced recently by Halpern and Pass. We give the first application of IRM to simultaneous voting games. We study positional scoring rules in detail and give theoretical results demonstrating the bias of IRM toward sincere voting. We present comprehensive simulation results of the effect on social welfare of IRM compared to both sincere and optimal voting. The results fit into a broader research theme of the welfare consequences of strategic voting .

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تاریخ انتشار 2014