Nash equilibria in symmetric graph games with partial observation
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria for qualitative objectives in this game model.
منابع مشابه
Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undeci...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Inf. Comput.
دوره 254 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017