No Cognition without Representation? Dynamical Computationalism and the Emulation Theory of Representation

The dynamical hypothesis threatens computationalism and its commitment to mental representations: the continuous, reciprocally causative nature of cognition renders impossible such an analysis. Andy Clark and Rick Grush have suggested a hybrid approach that models cog-nitive systems using dynamical systems theory but employs mental representation via emulation to aid its explanations. I will call such a view dynamical computationalism and in this paper, I evaluate its prospects. The proposed 'architecture' of representation, which a cognitive agent must possess in order to be distinguished from a merely adaptive one, uses a notion of partial agent-environment coupling to facilitate its use of representations. In the capacity for emulating the environment for use as internal representation, dynamical computationalism claims to have laid down a necessary condition for cognition. I will show that this approach reveals a misunderstanding of the force of the dynamical hypothesis. I argue too, against the plausibility 1 and the necessity of the condition laid down: it is framed in terms of a capacity for emulation, but its absence is compatible with cognitive behavior. Dynamical computationalism would be better oo without such an implausible condition on cognition elevated to the status of a necessity.