Nomic-Role Nonreductionsim: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles

I introduce “nomic-role nonreductionism” as an alternative to causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. It is inspired by recent trends in cognitive science that emphasize embodied cognition and multi-level methods of explanation in the special sciences. While causal-role functionalists identify mental properties by an intra-level transition theory that describes relations between inputs, internal mental states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that includes inter-level facts about realization from the appropriate implementation sciences. Thus mental properties are understood by a broad network that includes a horizontal dimension of intra-level causal relations as well as a vertical dimension of inter-level realization relations. To set the stage, in section 1 I describe the popular second-order version of causal-role functionalism. In section 2 I present the alternative nomic-role nonreductionism. In section 3 I support this view by an argument that generalizes upon an imputed rationale for scientific versions of causal-role functionalism. In section 4 I consider some possible problems. Then in section 5 I describe a general account of property identity that utilizes the same picture of causal and realization relations.