Information Ethics as Ideology

If we live indeed in the early stages of what has been termed the " information society, " then it is clear that ethical concerns with regards to information are of central importance. This can explain the growing interest in issues of information ethics. The use of the word " ethics " seems to suggest that there is something wrong or bad and that this can be addressed by morally acceptable means. This article will take a different view. It will argue that issues and discourses concerning information ethics can be used for purposes that are not necessarily in accordance with the ethical assumptions on which they are built. The article should thus be seen in the tradition of critical research. It aims to promote the emancipation of researchers as well as practitioners with regards to the use of ethical terms in information, and information and communication technology (ICT). The main argument is that ethical discourses can be used as ideological tools. Ideology will be understood as a shared worldview that favors particular interests. It leads to the closure of debate and reification of meaning and understanding. An example of ideology could be the view that it is the nature of women to rear children and look after the home. If this is generally accepted as a true description of the world, then no debate about it is necessary. Clearly, such a view of the world is favorable for some, not for others. Moral arguments, this article will argue, lend themselves to contribute to ideology. In our example, a moral argument would be that it is good for women to conform with their natural role. This would strengthen the patriarchal ideology. In order to support this contention, the article will begin by discussing an important concept in information ethics: privacy. I will argue that privacy derives its importance in current debates from its irreducible ethical quality. In the next step I will then define ideology and provide examples of how privacy can be used to promote particular interests. I will conclude the article by pointing out that it is the moral nature of the term privacy that renders it a useful tool for ideology. I will discuss the question whether the debates in information ethics can or should react to such (mis)use of moral arguments. When trying to prove that the moral quality of privacy is a factor in its …