Voting: Beyond Simple Majorities and Single-Winner Elections (Dagstuhl Seminar 17261)
نویسندگان
چکیده
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 17261 “Voting: Beyond simple majorities and single-winner elections”. The seminar featured five survey talks, a series of classic scientific presentations, working group discussions, open problems sessions (with the first one used to establish working groups and the last one to present their results). The seminar was mostly focused on multiwinner elections (from discussions of their algorithmic properties to political-science considerations), but the topics of real-life voting experiments and strategic behavior received attention as well. Seminar June 25–30, 2017 – http://www.dagstuhl.de/17261 1998 ACM Subject Classification I.2.11 Distributed Artificial Intelligence
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Dagstuhl Reports
دوره 7 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017