Anonymous Price Taking Equilibrium in Tiebout Economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs we demonstrate nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate that ∗We are indebted to Manfredo Dix, Vladislav Gorlov, Mamoru Kaneko, Hideo Konishi, Tom Nechyba, Roy Radner, and Bill Weiss for helpful comments. We are also indebted to the National Science Foundation of the U.S. and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for support.
منابع مشابه
Anonymous Price Taking Equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with a Continuum of Agents; Existence and Characterization
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs, which simply ensures that equal treatment payoffs are bounded above, we demonstrate nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate, under the stronger condition of strict small group effectiveness, that t...
متن کاملMigration-Proof Tiebout Equilibrium:† Existence and Asymptotic Efficiency
Tiebout’s basic claim was that when public goods are local, competition between jurisdictions solves the free riding problem in the sense that equilibria exist and are always Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, the literature does not quite support this conjecture. For finite economies, one must choose between notions of Tiebout equilibrium which are Pareto optimal but which may be empty, or which...
متن کاملTiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics
We consider a Tiebout economy with di®erential crowding and public projects in which agents are distinguished by their tastes and genetic endowments. Agents choose which crowding characteristic, for example, skill, they wish to express, and this a®ects their value to other members of their jurisdiction, club, ̄rm, etc. An agent's choice is in°uenced both by his genetic endowment, which a®ects h...
متن کاملA Simple Ascending Generalized Vickrey Auction∗
We design a simple ascending Vickrey auction for the combinatorial allocation problem. We make use of a concept called universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) price to design our auction. Our auction searches for a UCE price, which (along with an efficient allocation) provides enough information to compute the Vickrey payments of buyers. Our auction maintains non-linear and non-anonymous prices...
متن کاملMarkets and contracts 1
Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive, anonymous markets are viable. For a generic economy, the...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006