Institutions and moral hazard in open economies
نویسنده
چکیده
I investigate the interaction between international trade and national institutional development in an environment characterized by heterogeneous individuals choosing their education levels to maximize their utilities; and institutions alleviating moral hazard by allowing managers to better observe and verify the productive efforts of workers. Liberalized trade allows institutions to serve as independent sources of comparative advantage. In this setting, I examine the effect of trade liberalization on the distribution of income in institutionally developed and underdeveloped nations. Trade affects income via a direct effect on prices and an indirect effect on the incentives to invest in education. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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