Essays on Darwinism 3: Genic and Organismic Selection

The notion that genes play a uniquely distinguished rôle in biological evolution has been championed by Richard Dawkins (1976; 1989b). Furthermore, Dawkins has argued that this idea can be generalised in a way which makes it applicable to any properly Darwinian evolutionary process, at least if that process gives rise to a growth in adaptive complexity (Dawkins 1983). It is evident, therefore, that if Dawkins’ analysis is correct, it has profound implications for any attempt to realise a growth of adaptive complexity in artificial systems by Darwinian means. This essay is concerned with a detailed evaluation and critique of Dawkins’ claims, and, to a lesser extent, of the related analysis carried out by David L. Hull (1980; 1981). It provides a reformulation which, it is claimed, captures the core of valid insights which these workers have achieved while, at the same time, avoiding certain confusions and misconceptions which might otherwise be read into their views. The essay draws on concepts introduced in two previous essays (McMullin 1992a; 1992b); the three essays are therefore best read in conjunction with each other.