Theories of knowledge organization — theories of knowledge

Any ontological theory commits us to accept and classify a number of phenomena in a more or less specific way – and vice versa: a classification tends to reveal the theoretical outlook of its creator. Objects and their descriptions and relations are not just “given” but determined by theories. Knowledge is fallible and consensus is rare. By implication, knowledge organization has to consider different theories/views and their foundations. Bibliographical classifications depend on subject knowledge and on the same theories as corresponding scientific and scholarly classifications. Some classifications are based on logical distinctions, others on empirical examinations, and some on mappings of common ancestors or on establishing functional criteria. To evaluate a classification is to involve oneself in the research which has produced the given classification. Because research is always based more or less on specific epistemological ideals (e.g. empiricism, rationalism, historicism or pragmatism), the evaluation of classification includes the evaluation of the epistemological foundations of the research on which given classifications have been based. The field of knowledge organization itself is based on different approaches and traditions such as user-based and cognitive views, facet-analytical views, numeric taxonomic approaches, bibliometrics and domain-analytic approaches. These approaches and traditions are again connected to epistemological views, which have to be considered. Only the domain-analytic view is fully committed to exploring knowledge organization in the light of subject knowledge and substantial scholarly theories. 1. Ontological commitment Knowledge organization (KO) is about classifying knowledge, for example, to define concepts and determine their semantic relations, i.e. to define “cat” (Felis catus) and its relation to other concepts such as “mammal” (Mammalia) (in this case the semantic relation is termed an “is-a” relation, a “generic” relation, a “genus-species” relation among others). In other words: KO is about concepts and their semantic relations (and at the same time about the real world, here: animals). How do we know what a cat is (i.e. what the concept “cat” means)? How do we know the relation between “cat” and other species (such as “dog”)? How do we know what “a species” means? And how do we know the relations between a given species and genera, families, kingdoms etc.? These are far less trivial questions than most people believe them to be: in mainstream biological systematics major groups of animals (such as fishes and reptiles) are no longer regarded as valid taxa (i.e. groups of organisms recognized as formal units, although they continue to be studied and written about), cf. Blake (2011, 467). This example also shows that terms and classifications (such as “fishes” and “reptiles”) are inconsistently used even within one domain (biology): the new taxonomic victory has been incomplete. 2 Normally non-experts would just say that we know what a cat is and that we know that it is a mammal. If challenged we might look it up in an authoritative source, either a general encyclopaedia like Encyclopaedia Britannica or an authoritative biological handbook (such as Wilson and Reeder 2005), or ask some experts. But of course, different sources may disagree and in the end we have to argue why the chosen source is authoritative. If we take the question to the extreme we have to leave second-hand knowledge (Wilson 1983) and involve ourselves in research in biological taxonomy and the philosophy of classification. Many influential philosophers subscribe to the principle of fallibilism, which is a philosophical doctrine, most closely associated with Charles Sanders Peirce, which maintains that our scientific knowledge claims are invariably vulnerable and may turn out to be false. Fallibilism does not insist on the falsity of our scientific claims but rather on their tentativeness as inevitable estimates; it does not hold that knowledge is unavailable, but rather that it should always be considered provisional (Rescher 1998). We have “known” for a long time that the planets of our sun are: Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune and Pluto. In August 2006, however, the International Astronomical Union redefined the term “planet”, and classified Pluto along with some asteroids as a dwarf planet. This example thus confirms the principle of fallibilism (and by implication all knowledge organization systems (KOSs) had to be updated). This is also the case with the classification of animals: Scientists aim to describe a single “tree of life” that reflects the evolutionary relationships of living things. However, evolutionary relationships are a matter of ongoing discovery, and there are different opinions about how living things should be grouped and named. EOL [Encyclopedia of Life] reflects these differences by supporting several different scientific “classifications”. Some species have been named more than once. Such duplicates are listed under synonyms. EOL also provides support for common names which may vary across regions as well as languages http://eol.org/pages/2850509/names. By implication it is not wise to claim that “we know X to be a kind of Y” or that “we know that concept X is semantically related to concept Y by a certain relation such as a genus-species relation”. It is wiser to say “based on current theory X is considered a kind of Y”. We then have to examine whether or not there is scientific consensus. Non-specialists tend to overestimate the degree of consensus in science, as pointed out by Broadfield (1946, 69-70): “Consensus is most likely to appear among the unenlightened, of whom it is characteristic to be unanimous on the truth of what is false. In intellectual matters agreement is rare, especially in live issues.” In cases where there is no consensus the classifier has to make a decision based on an evaluation and negotiation of the different positions. Such a classification cannot be neutral, but will favour some views at the expense of others. This has been clear for a long time and also expressed in my former publications. Feinberg wrote, however: While Hjorland (1998[b]) then asserts that classification is not neutral and is theory-laden, this seems to be based more on the idea that the material to be classified is theory-laden, than that [a] classificationist is actively designing a certain view in the classification. A domain, for