Shared Reality, System Justification, and the Relational Basis of Ideological Beliefs

Although it is tempting to think that one’s political convictions reflect independent and unbiased thinking, research increasingly suggests that ideologies reflect motivational processes. The present paper integrates system justification and shared reality theories to propose that ideologies may function as prepackaged units of interpretation that spread because of basic human motives to understand the world, avoid existential threat, and maintain valued interpersonal relationships. The authors review evidence suggesting that affiliative motives may influence ideological beliefs to align with the progressive or conservative views shared within a given relationship or group. At the same time, such motives may lead disproportionately to the adoption of system-justifying worldviews. Implications for the context dependence of ideological convictions, the role that shared reality may play in group conflicts, and the relational bases of revolutionary change are discussed. Often our need for others is not love at all but only the need to be sustained in our illusions, even as we sustain others in theirs. – Thomas Merton (1979, 23) Contrary to the common view that human beliefs result from a more or less rational use of evidence, it is well documented that beliefs and opinions frequently result from biased, selective, and motivated processing of information (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Kunda, 1990; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Humans excel at believing what they wish to believe, sometimes even in the face of disconfirming evidence (e.g., Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995), and the individual’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by others much more than is typically recognized (e.g., Asch, 1952; Festinger, 1954; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Kawakami, Dovidio, & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Sherif, 1936; Sinclair, Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2005b; Turner, 1991). Although it is tempting to assume that at least the most self-defining, weighty, and principled convictions – such as ideological opinions – escape the clutch of motivation and social influence, it seems increasingly unlikely that they do (see Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a,b). 172 Shared Reality and Ideology © 2007 The Authors Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2/1 (2008): 171–186, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00056.x Journal Compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd A Tale of Two Theories (and Three Motives) In this article, we start by summarizing theory and research on the role of system justification in giving shape to the ideological opinions and values of individuals. This work suggests that two classes of motivation, namely epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty and existential motives to minimize threat, are capable of influencing ideological outcomes ( Jost, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2004). Next, we propose that there is also a third, relational motivation that underpins ideological opinions. From this perspective, ideology is linked to processes of social influence and the motivation to achieve and maintain ‘shared reality’ with others (Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). An integration of these two theories (and three motives) suggests that it is possible to provide a more complete account of the psychological origins of political beliefs than currently exists in the research literature. System justification theory In laying out the basic tenets of system justification theory, Jost and Banaji (1994) proposed that ‘there is a general psychological tendency to justify and rationalize the status quo, that is, a motive to see the system as good, fair, legitimate, and desirable’. Although system justification results in negative consequences for some individuals – most especially for members of disadvantaged groups who are harmed by the current state of affairs – there are a number of psychological reasons why it would be functional for people to actively seek to justify the status quo ( Jost & Hunyady, 2002). These include epistemic motives to establish order, structure, closure, and certainty as well as existential motives to perceive a safe, reassuring environment ( Jost, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Experimental studies reveal that people defend and bolster the legitimacy of the societal status quo following exposure to various manipulations of system threat, including exposure to passages highlighting crises of legitimacy or stability in society (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007). These results, which demonstrate defensive ideological responses on behalf of the system, are consistent with the notion that a general system justification motive exists. Ideologies differ in the extent to which they serve to justify reigning social systems (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2005). For example, conservative ideology typically favors preserving the societal status quo, whereas liberal, radical, and progressive ideologies often seek to reform or revise it (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, b; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Consistent with this formulation, Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (forthcoming) found in several samples of student respondents that system-justifying attitudes are endorsed more enthusiastically by conservatives than liberals. In this research, selfreported conservatism scores strongly predicted scores on Kay and Jost’s