The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n ≥ 2 office seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of voters’ ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize. In this sense, our analysis suggests that two-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 74 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012