Can Intentionalism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances?

نویسندگان

  • Sebastian Watzl
  • S. Watzl
چکیده

Recent psychological research shows that attention affects appearances. An “attended item looks bigger, faster, earlier, more saturated, stripier.” (Block 2010, p. 41). What is the significance of these findings? Ned Block has argued that they undermine representationism, roughly the view that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by its representational content. My first goal in this paper is to show that Block’s argument has the structure of a Problem of Arbitrary Phenomenal Variation and that it improves on other instances of arguments of the same form along several dimensions (most prominently, these are arguments based on the possibility of spectral inversion). My second goal is to consider responses to Block’s version of the arbitrariness problem. I will show that most of them have serious drawbacks. Overall, the best view is to accept that attention may distort perception, sacrificing veridicality for usability. I end my discussion by showing how to develop that view.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Can Representationism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances?

Recent psychological research shows that attention affects appearances. An “attended item looks bigger, faster, earlier, more saturated, stripier.” (Block 2010, p. 41). What is the significance of these findings? Ned Block has argued that they undermine representationism, roughly the view that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by its representational content. My first goal in...

متن کامل

Intentionalism about moods∗

According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up...

متن کامل

Analyzing the problem of meaning in Shabastari’s Golshane Raz

Man has always been finding a complete model for semantics since the beginning. A model which can as a paradigm affects all branches of sciences. In the view of author, such a model can be found in Golshane Raz. Introducing the model from the work mentioned, the paper has tried to explain its sub structural foundations in three fields of ontology, epistemology and semantics. Some of the foundat...

متن کامل

Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation 1

Externalist Intentionalism is the conjunction Intentionalism and the claim that the “awareness relation” (or the “sensory representation relation”) is a wide physical relation. I develop two empirically-based counterexamples to Externalist Intentionalism about experience, one involving color vision and the other involving pain. I argue that the correct verdict in these examples is Different Exp...

متن کامل

Flexible Attention to Labels and Appearances in Early Induction

Young children have been demonstrated to rely on both labeling and appearance information when performing induction. According to some accounts, labels are more conceptually important than appearances. According to others, reliance on labels and appearances stems from a lowlevel attentional mechanism. The latter, but not the former, predicts flexible attentional shifts in reliance on labels or ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2017