Modeling resource flow asymmetries using condensation networks

This paper examines strict Nash networks in the noncooperative directed flow model of Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68(5):1181–1230, 2000) with partner heterogeneity (payoff of a player in a link depends on the identity of her link partner). We focus on the asymmetries with regard to the resources obtained by players. Using the notion of condensation networks, we partition the population into groups of players who obtain the same resources and order these groups according to the resources they obtain. We show that the partner heterogeneity assumption impacts the strict Nash networks asymmetries in a different way than Galeotti (Econ Theory 29(1):163–179, 2006) player heterogeneity assumption (the payoff of a player in a link depends on her own identity). P. Billand Université de Lyon, Lyon 69003, France e-mail: [email protected] P. Billand Université Jean Monnet, 42000 Saint-Étienne, France P. Billand · C. Bravard CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 42000 Saint-Étienne, France C. Bravard Université Grenoble 2, UMR 1215 GAEL, 38000 Grenoble, France e-mail: [email protected] S. Sarangi (B) Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. Sarangi KIIT School of Management, Bhubaneswar, India