The Future of Armed Resistance: Cyberterror? Mass Destruction?

Executive Summary In May, 2000, a conference convened to examine the decisionmaking process that leads sub-state groups engaged in armed resistance to develop new operational methods. The conference was particularly concerned to understand whether such groups would engage in cyberterrorism, including the conditions under which they might try to cause mass disruption of information systems. The conference also examined whether such groups would try to cause mass casualties, particularly through the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The conference, organized by the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare of the Naval Postgraduate School, with the assistance of the Centre de Recherche sur les Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines of the University of Paris (II), was unprecedented in that its participants included former and active members of terrorist groups, as well as a hacker. It was equally unprecedented in the amount of time within and outside the formal structure of the conference that investigators were able to spend with these unique participants and in the opportunity to work with them through a series of problems in a controlled simulation. Together these characteristics made the conference an unique opportunity to learn about terrorism. The conference reached five principle conclusions: 1. The practitioners in the conference did not use information technology to cause mass disruption. They sought to inflict mass casualties only in one narrowly defined situation. 2. Because sub-state groups with political objectives have reasons to limit the casualties they cause, these groups may find cyberterror an attractive non-lethal weapon. 3. By making it easier for sub-state groups to get their message out, the information and communication revolution may lessen the need for violence. 4. Judging from the small sample represented at the conference, terrorists have not yet integrated information technology into their strategy and tactics. 5. Again based on the small sample represented at the conference, significant barriers between hackers and terrorists may prevent their integration in one group. 6. Although sub-state groups with political objectives have strong incentives not to use force indiscriminately and to avoid attacks that cause mass casualties, a politically motivated group can find itself in a situation where its weakness and isolation make a mass casualty attack a rational choice. ii Fuller statements of these conclusions are set off in highlighted boxes in the body of the report for easy reference. This report details the reasoning that leads to these conclusions. It also explains how …