Information in Auctions: Disclosure
نویسنده
چکیده
Should a seller release public information before, or indeed during, an auction? The posing and answering of this question by Milgrom and Weber (1982a) (MWa) provides one of the cornerstones of present day auction theory and the result that disclosure is good for revenue has even become part of folk wisdom in some policy areas. In context of their general symmetric a¢ liated model. Milgrom and Weber showed both how to characterise equilibria and that revealing information publicly is always expected revenue enhancing. Furthermore, they showed that under these assumptions the sort of information generated by common auction processes is a¢ liated in the requisite way. So, in particular, ascending button auctions yield higher revenues than second price sealed bid auctions. Milgrom and Webers results should not lead to a general belief that the public disclosure of information is usually, and certainly not always, expected revenue enhancing. It depends very much on the statistical context of the situation at hand and there are many natural cases where information disclosure decreases expected revenue. This is true even in symmetric situations once the
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تاریخ انتشار 2005