History and Scientific Practice in the Construction of an Adequate Philosophy of Science : Revisiting a

William Whewell raised a series of objections concerning John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science which suggested that Mill’s views were properly informed neither by the history of science nor by adequate reflection on scientific practices. These objections, if accurate, would be devastating given Mill’s expressed aim of constructing a philosophy of science that was grounded on historical achievements in the sciences and the practices driving these developments. The aim of this paper is to revisit and evaluate this incisive Whewellian criticism of Mill’s views. I accomplish this task by assessing Whewell’s critique of Mill’s use of the discovery of electrical induction as an illustration of the Method of Difference. The historical evidence demonstrates that Mill’s reconstruction of this discovery is inadequate for many of the reasons Whewell cites. But a study of Michael Faraday’s research leading to this discovery also raises some questions about Whewell’s own characterization of this historical episode in the science of electromagnetism. Thus, this example provides an opportunity to reconsider the debate between Whewell and Mill concerning the role of the sciences in the development of an adequate philosophy of scientific methodology.