Unanimous rules in the laboratory
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 1 May 2016 Available online xxxx JEL classification: C92 D70
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 102 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017