Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
نویسندگان
چکیده
This note presents a counter-example to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters [3].
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 135 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007