Finite Reasons without Foundations

In this paper I develop a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein’s infinitism. The view I develop, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein’s principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the ‘reason for’ relation is constrained by PAA and PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the ‘reason for’ relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false by the maintaining that there is more to epistemic justification than what can be expressed in any reasoning session. One crucial argument for Framework Reasons is that justification depends on a background of plausibility considerations. In the final section, I apply this view of reasons to Michael Bergmann’s argument any non-skeptical epistemology must embrace epistemic circularity. 1 Circularity & Arbitrariness Peter Klein has rehabilitated the regress problem for foundationalism and has championed a novel infinitist solution. The two key principles for the regress argument are the principles of avoiding circularity and avoiding arbitrariness. Both principles are supported by natural judgements. The principle of avoiding circularity is, ∗This paper was presented at Vanderbilt University for a workshop on the regress argument. I am grateful to Scott Aikin and Jeanne Peijnenburg for organizing a terrific workshop and also for putting together this volume. Also, I thank the participants for excellent feedback on this paper. I develop the Framework Reasons in (Poston forthcoming, Ch 3) See (Klein 2000, 2004, 2005, 2007b,a)