Peace agreements without commitment

نویسندگان

  • Carmen Beviá
  • Luis C. Corchón
چکیده

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military pro…ciency of the "rich" country is su¢ ciently large, the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country. We are grateful to C. Alós, B. Bueno de Mesquita, J. Conley, D. Cardona, J. Eguia, R. Ferrer, K. Huang, P. Liangh, H. Llavador, A. Nakkas, D. Ong, C. Plott, M. Quinzii, J. Reingannum, S. Sánchez-Pagés, J. Silvestre, Q. Wen, A. Wolinsky, J. Weymark and audiences in seminars at Vanderbilt University, Northwestern University, California University at Davis, and CALTECH, for very helpful suggestions. The …rst author acknowledges …nancial support from SEJ2005-01481/ECON and FEDER, 2005SGR-00454, and the Barcelona Economics Program (XREA). The second author acknowledges …nancial support from SEJ2005-06167/ECON.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 68  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010