Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments among Players
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding o ers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to eÆcient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others. JEL classi cation numbers: C72, D72, D78, H41, K12
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, princip...
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