On the Use of Rational Choice Theory in Evolutionary Biology

The aim of this paper is to offer some philosophical reflections on the use of rational choice theory within evolutionary biology. Since the 1960s, concepts and models from rational choice theory have often utilized by biologists, usually with some modifications, to shed light on evolutionary phenomena. This is particularly true in behavioural ecology – the science that studies animal behaviour from a Darwinian perspective. For example, Bayesian decision theory has been used to study foraging behaviour in animals (e.g. Houston and McNamara 1999); non-cooperative game theory has been used to study the evolution of strategic behaviour, a development that gave rise to evolutionary game theory (see Maynard Smith 1982, Hammerstein 2012 ); and bargaining theory has been used to study the division of reproduction within animal societies (Johnstone and Cant 2009, Roughgarden 2010). More recently, there have been attempts to use ideas from social choice theory to shed light on biological scenarios involving individuals with divergent interests living in groups (Okasha 2009, 2012; Conradt and List 2009; Bossert, Qi and Weymark 2013).