Fairness in Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
نویسنده
چکیده
A bargaining solution guarantees minimal equity if each player’s payoff is at least as large as the minimum of the payoffs assigned to him by the equal-gain (i.e., egalitarian) and equal-loss solutions. The KalaiSmorodinsky solution is the unique scale-invariant 2-person solution with this property. There does not exist a scale-invariant n-person solution with this property.
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