Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games*
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium. J.E.L. CLASSIFICATION NUMBERS: C73, D83 MAILING ADDRESS: Martin W. Cripps Department of Economics University of Warwick Coventry CV4 7AL England
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تاریخ انتشار 1996