The expressivist objection to prenatal diagnosis: can it be laid to rest?

Received 24 May 2007 Accepted 24 May 2007 Tom Shakespeare’s book Disability rights and wrongs is very rich and interesting and ought to be compulsory reading for anyone interested in the relation between disability and medical ethics. In my short contribution to this symposium on the book, I will focus on a particular aspect of his discussion of prenatal diagnosis and termination of pregnancy. In chapter 6 of Disability rights and wrongs, a chapter entitled Questioning prenatal diagnosis, the author discusses a wide range of issues concerning the relation between disability and prenatal diagnosis. One of the arguments he discusses is the so-called ‘‘expressivist objection’’ to prenatal diagnosis—that is, the claim that prenatal diagnosis expresses a discriminatory or negative attitude towards people with disability. After having analysed the expressivist objection, Shakespeare, in line with a range of other authors, concludes that the argument is not sound: