Gerry Stahl Meaning and Interpretation in Collaboration

Because collaborative learning takes place through processes of shared meaning-making, CSCL must be concerned with the nature of meaning and social meaning-making practices. Philosophic analysis suggests that meanings are necessarily shared; they persist in linguistic and physical artifacts in our culture and situation. However, these meanings must be interpreted by individuals. There is a dynamic relationship between shared meanings and individual interpretations: In order to engage in collaborative activities, people must come to recognize meanings of artifacts, and interpret these meanings from their own perspectives. The interplay between meaning and interpretation has implications for CSCL research methodology and for CSCL technology design. 1. CSCL AND MEANING-MAKING In his keynote talk at CSCL 2002, Koschmann identified the concept of meaning – as it is discussed in the philosophic tradition – as dwelling at the fundamental core of CSCL (Koschmann, 2002a). Arguing from a close reading of Dewey, he proposed, CSCL is a field of study centrally concerned with meaning and the practices of meaning-making in the context of joint activity, and the ways in which these practices are mediated through designed artifacts. (p. 20.) Despite Koschmann’s careful crafting of this programmatic statement, it remains open to ambiguous interpretation. As can be seen from the discussion following the keynote (Henderson & Wyman, 2002), it is possible to interpret meaning-making as a psychological process that takes place in individuals’ minds and to understand the reference to designed artifacts as narrowly referring to CSCL software systems. In my Introduction to the Proceedings that include the keynote, I indicated a possible alternative reading of this definition of the field of CSCL (Stahl, 2002c). I suggested that meaning-making can be treated as an essentially social activity that is conducted jointly – collaboratively – by a community, rather than by individuals who happen to be co-located. In addition, the mediation of meaning-making by artifacts can be seen more generally than just as the transmission of personal opinions through the communication channel of a technological artifact. That is to say, the meaning-making practices do not merely take place within a “context of joint activity,” as actions might take place within the four walls of a room. Rather, the context of joint activity is those practices – the practices form the context. Similarly, the meaning is not merely transferred from mind to mind by the activities, but the meaning is constructed by and exists as those activities. Similarly, artifacts are not simply instruments for conveying independent meanings, but are themselves embodiments of meaning. Of course, people are necessarily involved in meaning-making as interpreters of the meaning, but this does not imply that the meaning only exists in the isolated heads of the individuals. These are some of the issues to be addressed in this paper.