Optimal Transfers in Noncooperative Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider “social contracts” which alter the payoffs of players in a noncoperative game, generating new Nash Equilibria (NE). In the domain of contracts which — in conjunction with their concomitant NE — are “self-financing”, our focus is on those that are (Pareto) optimal. By way of a key example, we examine optimal levels of crime and punishment in a population equilibrium. JEL Classification: C70, C72, C79, D44, D63, D82.
منابع مشابه
Game theory and risk-based leveed river system planning with noncooperation
Optimal risk-based levee designs are usually developed for economic efficiency. However, in river systems with multiple levees, the planning and maintenance of different levees are controlled by different agencies or groups. For example, along many rivers, levees on opposite riverbanks constitute a simple leveed river system with each levee designed and controlled separately. Collaborative plan...
متن کاملNoncooperative games with noncompact joint strategies sets: Increasing best responses and approximation to equilibrium points
In this paper conditions proposed in Flores-Hernández and Montes-de-Oca [3] which permit to obtain monotone minimizers of unbounded optimization problems on Euclidean spaces are adapted in suitable versions to study noncooperative games on Euclidean spaces with noncompact sets of feasible joint strategies in order to obtain increasing optimal best responses for each player. Moreover, in this no...
متن کاملFuzzy differential games for nonlinear stochastic systems: suboptimal approach
A fuzzy differential game theory is proposed to solve the -person (or -player) nonlinear differential noncooperative game and cooperative game (team) problems, which are not easily tackled by the conventional methods. In this paper, both noncooperative and cooperative quadratic differential games are considered. First, the nonlinear stochastic system is approximated by a fuzzy model. Based on t...
متن کاملGame of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union
In this paper we present an application of the dynamic tracking games framework to 1 a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear three-country macroeconomic model of a 2 monetary union to analyse the interactions between fiscal (governments) and monetary (common 3 central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using 4 the OPTGAME algorithm ...
متن کاملRouting Games
This chapter studies the inefficiency of equilibria in noncooperative routing games, in which selfinterested players route traffic through a congested network. Our goals are threefold: to introduce the most important models and examples of routing games; to survey optimal bounds on the price of anarchy in these models; and to develop proof techniques that are useful for bounding the inefficienc...
متن کامل