Moore’s Paradox, Direct Doxastic Voluntarism, and Atheist Distrust

The concept of belief is analyzed and then discussed within the context of the current climate of atheist distrust in America. To begin, Moore’s Paradox, and its relationship to an important claim made by Wittgenstein regarding false beliefs, is explored. Next, the definition of belief that results from affirming Wittgenstein’s claim is outlined and subsequently defended from an attempted refutation constructed by John N. Williams. The defended definition of belief, which regards direct doxastic voluntarism as false, is then used to argue that atheists do not directly choose to not believe in any gods so as to evade moral responsibility. Direct doxastic voluntarism is the notion that human beings have direct and voluntary control over their beliefs, and it is commonly regarded as false (Booth 2007, 115-130). In this paper, I will refute John N. Williams’s attempt to invalidate a claim made by Ludwig Wittgenstein that, if successfully invalidated, would give credence to the doctrine of direct doxastic voluntarism. Therefore, by defending Wittgenstein’s claim, which is based on Moore’s Paradox, I am indirectly defending the stance that direct doxastic voluntarism is false. Next, in an effort to use philosophical theory as a form of social activism, I will explore the implications of refuting Williams by examining how the falsity of direct doxastic voluntarism affects people that identify as atheists or non-believers. To be more specific, I will argue that while the unfavorable reputation of atheists in America should be reconsidered for numerous reasons, one specific reason that deserves more attention is that an atheist’s lack of direct control over her lack of belief in God should eliminate the worry that atheists choose to not believe in God so as to escape the moral codes commonly offered by religions. To begin on this complex journey of theory and application, I will first describe Moore’s Paradox and how it is essential to this discussion. Background: Moore’s Paradox Ludwig Wittgenstein was apparently impressed by G.E. Moore’s discovery of a type of absurdity that arises from phrases such as the following: “It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining” (Malcolm 1984, 56). Wittgenstein went on to coin the term “Moore’s Paradox” for this brand of absurdity in his book entitled Philosophical Investigations. After analyzing Moore’s discovery, Wittgenstein concluded, “If there were a verb meaning ‘to believe falsely’, it would not have any significant first person indicative” (Wittgenstein 1958, 190). Put in simpler terms, Wittgenstein concluded that one cannot reasonably make the assertion, “I falsely believe that p.” 1 Thompson: Moore’s Paradox, Direct Doxastic Voluntarism, and Atheist Distrust