Towards a unified scheme for environmental and social protection: Learning from PES and CCT experiences in developing countries ¬リニ

a r t i c l e i n f o Environmental protection and poverty alleviation in the developing world are usually heralded as joint objectives. However, these two goals are often associated with different sectoral policy instruments. While so−called payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly being promoted for environmental protection, poverty alleviation is increasingly addressed by conditional cash transfers (CCT) program. These instruments although aimed to achieve distinct objectives have a number of similarities and challenges in their design and implementation phases. This paper elaborates on these similarities and develops a unifying generic framework that is used to discuss the extent to which both approaches could be unified. Environmental conservation and poverty alleviation are the two key policy areas that continue to receive increasing attention from governments, donors and NGOs in the developing world. The complex links between poverty and environmental degradation continue to be the focus of much research and debate and it is unlikely to be closed However, there is increasing consensus about the policy instruments to be used to tackle both problems, albeit in a rather piecemeal approach. The current thrust is mostly on payments for environmental services (PES) to correct market failures that lead to excessive levels of environmental degradation (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2006, 2008). 1 While on the other hand, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are being implemented to correct market failures that lead to underinvestment in social protection in PES constitute economic transfers (in the form of monetary payments, or in kind rewards) aiming to compensate a target group (normally land holders) for the opportunity cost of providing positive environmental externalities (environmental services) to a group of actors that can pay by either creating a market or other informally devised institutional mechanism between private agents, as well as through the State's public funds for the environmental services they expect to receive. These transfers when properly designed and implemented link the payment with a set of environmental conditions and land management practices that promote the provision of socially valuable environmental services (Bulte and Zilberman, 2008; Engel et al., 2008; Muradian et al., 2010). While PES programs are primarily cost-effective conservation strategies (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002), there is increasing interest on the potential positive effect of PES on the livelihoods of poor landholders (Grieg-Gran et al. programs have also received criticisms due to their potential negative effects in terms of maintaining asymmetric …